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In 1999, the United States and other major donor countries supported an historic expansion of the heavily 
indebted poor country (HIPC) debt relief initiative.  HIPC had two primary goals: reduce poor countries’ debt 
burdens to levels that would allow them to achieve sustainable growth; and promote a new way of assisting 
poor countries focused on home-grown poverty alleviation and human development.  Three years after the 
initiative came into existence, we are beginning to see the apparent impact that HIPC is having, particularly 
on recipient countries' ability and willingness to increase domestic spending on education and HIV/AIDS 
programs.  Yet it has also become clear that the HIPC program is not providing a sufficient level of 
predictability or sustainability to allow debtor countries (and donors) to reap the larger benefits, particularly 
in terms of sustained growth and poverty reduction, originally envisioned.  An adequate amount of 
predictable debt relief can be an extremely efficient way of transferring resources to poor countries with 
reasonable economic management (indeed, more effective than traditional aid).  But the full benefits of the 
transfer, in improved capacity to manage their economies, and in increased investor confidence in an 
economy's future, require that creditors, investors and committed recipient government officials have 
confidence that the improved debt situation will be sustained over the medium term.  After reviewing some 
of the main critiques and proposals for change, we offer here a new way forward -- a proposal to deepen, 
widen, and most importantly insure debt relief to poor countries.  We focus on the insurance aspect of our 
proposal, that would safeguard countries against external shocks for a decade, and on the advantages of 
financing such insurance by limited mobilization of IMF gold. We see this proposal as a practical way to 
make debt relief more predictably sustainable in HIPC countries, and a proposal around which international 
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  Jubilee 2000 – a worldwide citizens’ movement supported by the pop star Bono, Pope John 
Paul II, and millions of ordinary churchgoing people the United States and Europe – was the most 
successful developed-country movement aimed at combating world poverty for many years, 
perhaps in all recorded history. It succeeded not just in changing official policy, but in arousing an 
unusual measure of concern among the world’s rich about the state of the world’s poor.  Jubilee 
campaigners argued convincingly that the debts owed by poor countries to rich institutions like the 
IMF and World Bank and to the governments of industrial countries were an unjust burden on their 
citizens, who were paying obligations mostly assumed by corrupt past leaders.  And this debt was 
sabotaging the ability of even the most reformist, well-intentioned governments to provide 
minimal social services to their citizens. Jubilee’s success was embodied the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, agreed to by all the major donors in 1999.
2   
 
While the political momentum behind the initiative was new, the 1999 agreement 
represented only one more step – a big one, admittedly – in more than a decade of international 
negotiations aimed at reducing the debt burden of the poorest countries of the world (Box 1 
catalogues this history).   
 
For the donors, HIPC was not just good politics.  Donor countries had another reason to swallow 
hard, organize, and cancel some of the debt owed to them by the world’s poorest countries.  Two 
decades of official lending at cheap rates had failed to catalyze the increased growth and new 
economic activities needed to finance the resulting debt. Donors had therefore gotten locked into 
“defensive lending.”  Unwilling to let poor countries explicitly default, especially to the 
multilateral creditors, they were stuck with endless rounds of rescheduling debt and negotiating 
new grants and loans to help poor countries pay back old loans, sometimes independent of 
recipient countries’ ability to use any external resources well.
3
 
                                                 
* This paper builds upon and expands the ideas presented in Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid 
Architecture, by Nancy Birdsall and John Williamson, with Brian Deese (Institute for International Economics/Center 
for Global Development, 2002). 
1 Nancy Birdsall (nbirdsall@cgdev.org) is President, and Brian Deese (bdeese@cgdev.org) is a researcher at the 
Center for Global Development. 
2 As background to the concerns raised by Jubilee 2000 and the debt relief issue more generally, we present an 
appendix of ten commonly asked questions and their answers.   
3 Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2000) show that in a subgroup African countries with unusually high multilateral 
debt as a share of total debt, the donors collectively (with the important exception of IDA) appear to have channeled 
resources independently of country capability. 
  2Debt relief seemed to hold out the promise of getting both the donors and the debtors back 
on track.  Since 1999, the more than $1.3 billion released annually in the 26 countries already 
approved for debt relief has had some apparent impact.
4  But it has also become clear that the 
current program is not providing a sufficient level of predictability or sustainability to allow debtor 
countries (and donors) to reap the full benefits originally envisioned.  Many countries will continue 
to have unsustainable levels of debt after HIPC, owed particularly to multilateral donors like the 
World Bank and IMF.   
 
We begin this paper by presenting an analytical argument why debt relief can be a more 
efficient resource transfer than just more new aid.  We then turn to the current HIPC framework, 
and review some of the main critiques and proposals for change.  Building on the critiques and 
proposals, we conclude by offering a new way forward -- a three-pronged proposal to deepen, 
widen, and insure debt relief to poor countries.  We focus on the third of these proposals, as the 
most critical and practically feasible debt relief reform around which international donors could 
consolidate their efforts in the near term.          
 
Debt relief is effective aid 
 
  Debt relief can be more efficient than traditional aid, particularly in countries with a record 
of responsible government and reasonable respect for the rule of law.  Why?   
 
Debt relief helps correct traditional bad habits of the international donors. 
 
Debt relief cannot be tied to wasteful donor practices – Aid is said to be “tied” when recipient 
countries are required to purchase goods or services from donor country contractors and suppliers.  
The practice is highly inefficient, reducing the value of aid by an estimated 15 to 30 percent.
5 
Donors pledged, in the spring of 2000, to end the practice, but exempted food aid and technical 
assistance from that decision.  Technical assistance (mostly consultant advice and training) makes 
up as much as 25 percent of total development assistance.  In a country like Mozambique, U.S. or 
German consultants funded by the U.S. or Germany can cost 10 to 20 times as much as their 
competitors from Brazil or South Africa.  Assuming that poor countries could get only twice (not 
10 times) as much value for each dollar spent in a competitive world market for technical 
assistance, and adding to that the cost of continuing to tie food aid, we estimate that donors will 
continue to waste some $7 billion per year in aid resources, even after the OECD countries have 
implemented their pledge.   
 
In contrast to new aid disbursements, which may be inefficiently “tied,” debt relief comes in the 
form of direct budget support to developing country governments. 
                                                 
4 The World Bank has been able to track an increase in social expenditures in these countries of nearly the same 
amount (some countries used external debt relief to write down domestic debts).  About 40 percent of the debt savings 
are being directed to education and 25 percent to health care.  Nearly every HIPC is using a portion of debt relief to 
create or expand HIV/AIDS prevention and education programs.  Tanzania ended fees for grade school, and Benin 
ended fees in rural areas - giving millions of children the chance to go to school.  Honduras will offer three more years 
of free schooling, so that public school students can go up to the ninth grade.  Uganda has put every child in grade 
school, and will hire more teachers and pay for more classrooms and textbooks.  Mali, Mozambique and Senegal will 
increase spending on HIV/AIDS prevention, to slow the spread of the pandemic. 
5 Estimate is from Chinnock, Jeffery. (1998) “In Whose Benefit? The Case for Untying Aid.”  ActionAid.  
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Debt relief liberates donors from inefficient ‘defensive lending’-Research shows that aid works 
better in countries where governments are responsible and pursuing sensible economic policies.  
But in the 1990s, donor behavior was characterized by defensive lending – transferring more 
resources to those countries with the highest debt, regardless of how well they were performing.  
This behavior was, in a peculiar sense, well-intentioned.  Donors wanted to avoid the negative 
multiplier effects on poor countries of falling into arrears with multilateral creditors.  But it 
nonetheless created a debt trap for donors as well as recipients, and made aid less effective.        
 
With sufficient debt reduction for the poorest countries, donors would be freed to make sound 
policies and institutions the sole basis for future decisions on where to spend.    
 
Debt relief allows for poor country ownership of development strategies. 
 
Debt relief reduces the huge transaction costs of conventional foreign aid programs. Acquiring 
and managing aid has high transaction costs for recipient countries. Talented government officials 
in aid-dependent countries must meet daily with local and visiting missions of the World Bank, the 
IMF, the European Union, UNDP, USAID, and other bilateral aid agencies, as well as with 
representatives of nongovernmental organizations.  All of these aid institutions have different, 
even competing approaches to health, environment, or financial sector reform, and each has 
different procurement, disbursement, and monitoring rules and customs.  In contrast, debt relief 
has the peculiar advantage of being like cash—it comes without significant transaction costs.  This 
allows recipient countries to streamline the management of aid resources and, with greater control 
and ownership over their use, it makes them fully accountable for results.  
 
Debt relief provides flexible budget support and makes governments accountable to citizens. 
Tanzania received about $700 million in new donor funding in 1999, and owed $230 million that 
year in debt payments, resulting in a net inflow of aid. But most of the new aid money was linked 
to specific projects or priorities favored by donors, so the Tanzanian government had to set aside 
$230 million of its limited tax revenues for debt repayment. (Typical HIPC countries spent (before 
debt relief) about 25 percent of tax revenue to repay existing debts.)  Donors prefer supporting 
projects to providing cash for budget support because project outputs can be monitored and 
measured, and projects often provide contracts for donor country consultants and suppliers. So 
even when countries have positive net transfers of aid (new aid minus payments on old debt), their 
ability to direct resources where it might be most effective is limited.   
 
Debt reduction allows governments to spend precious tax revenue on their own budget priorities, 
instead of on debt repayments. This makes governments more accountable to their citizens.  A shift 
of some aid resources from new projects to debt relief would give a boost to countries struggling to 
strengthen honest and democratic governance. 
 
Debt Relief Can Foster Private Investment 
 
A large amount of debt, and perpetual dependence on the beneficence of donors, creates 
uncertainty about a government’s finances and its ability to deliver macroeconomic stability.  
Investors worry about heavy future tax burdens imposed to sustain or write down public debt.  
  4Entrepreneurial energy is directed into less risky projects promising quicker returns – such as 
retailing, small construction, and marketing – rather than into major new businesses. Debt 
reduction that is irreversible and provides a reasonable guarantee of debt sustainability can restore 
investor confidence.    
 
Critique of the HIPC initiative 
 
The compelling case for debt relief per se has not isolated the enhanced HIPC initiative 
from criticism.
6  Its design and implementation have been closely scrutinized, due in large part to 
the success of the Jubilee movement in broadcasting the promise of debt relief as an alternative 
mechanism to change the development assistance business for the better.   
 
The many critiques can be put into two broad categories, representing two different 
perspectives on the underlying causes of the failure of development assistance programs in the 
poorest countries:   
 
• The “foreign aid down the rathole” camp.
7  These critics argue that debt relief and other 
forms of aid have been too great and too easy to get.  Recipient governments are often wasteful 
and corrupt.  Even in the best cases of reasonably adequate governance, aid and debt relief simply 
relieve countries’ immediate budget constraint, allowing them to persist with bad economic 
policies.  The official donors and creditors share some blame for providing too many loans, driven 
by a combination of political, commercial, and bureaucratic motives.  
 
For these critics, enhanced HIPC retains some traditional conditionality.  The IMF must still 
give the nod that macro policies are adequate for a country to reach the first step in the process, the 
decision point.  And the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), announced in 1999 were 
meant to address deeper concerns about poor governance and over-eager donors. The PRSP 
envisaged a process whereby governments (aided by World Bank staff) would convene extensive 
consultations with civil society and non-governmental actors, and prepare holistic, country-owned 
strategies that would form the basis for both HIPC and future donor assistance.   
  
But the requirements for the PRSP process have themselves provoked a fair amount of 
cynicism.  For critics of aid they seem no different from business as susal – in which much that is 
written and agreed is never implemented.
8  Another complaint – this time from friends of greater 
aid not just foes – is that in some countries parliaments have been largely by-passed in the process 
of popular consultation.
9  Concern has also been raised that the emphasis on poverty reduction via 
                                                 
6 Among the many critiques are Birdsall and Deese 2002, Eurodad 2001a, Roodman 2001, Oxfam 2001, Drop the 
Debt 2001, and Jubilee Plus 2001. 
7 This argument is represented by Easterly (2000), Thomas (2001) and in some measure by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). 
8 Many recalled that (for example) Letters of Intent to the IMF and Letters of Development Policy to the World Bank 
are also supposed to be documents produced by the borrowing government, but that in practice they have long been 
written by IMF and World Bank staffers and presented to the would-be borrowing government to sign. 
9 Unfortunately, there is an inherent tension between the focus on participation and the connection between the PRSP 
and release of HIPC debt relief proceeds, the second representing a form of donor-mandated conditionality that hinders 
the first.  While few argue that increased spending on education and health is a bad idea, many southern NGO and civil 
society advocates caution not to confuse the pre-set goals of the PRSP process with country ownership.  In May 2001, 
  5increases in social expenditures is primarily a donor-owned view, and would not necessarily be the 
optimal path for a country to attain sustainable growth and thus sustainable reductions in poverty.
10  
 
A final -- and critically important -- critique is that the PRSPs are not adequately addressing 
the task of monitoring, and that even if countries buy into the new donor conditionality, it will be 
impossible to tell where the proceeds of debt relief are really going.  The IMF (2001) found that 
only 2 of the HIPC countries will have the capacity to track spending related to debt relief 
transactions within the next year.   
 
• The “poverty trap” camp.
11  Under this argument, debt reduction is too small and tied to 
conditionality that is onerous and misguided.  Given the complex challenges that many poor 
countries face – conflict, ethnic fragmentation dependence on primary commodities with declining 
and unstable prices, tropical disease, and often small size -- debt relief and other forms of aid have 
been far from adequate to allow them to escape poverty and put them onto a growth path.   In this 
perspective, much more of the blame goes to creditors and donors.  Too much of the lending was 
wasteful and inefficient, sustaining donors’ own bureaucracies and financing purchases of their 
own goods and use of their own high-cost consultants.  Worst of all, much was politically 
motivated, incurred in dubious situations that call its legitimacy into question.  Should countries be 
expected to service such debt? Does elementary justice not demand that it be cancelled? 
 
The structure of the enhanced HIPC initiative responds more directly to this set of critics -- it is 
bigger (more costly for donors), and faster than previous debt relief efforts – yet they level three 
central critiques:   
 
A first criticism is that the basic criterion for HIPC eligibility – a country’s stock of debt as 
a share of its exports – is inappropriate (Eurodad 2001a,b).
12 The criticism is that this ratio is not 
really germane to whether a debtor country can afford to divert resources away from key social 
expenditures in order to service outstanding debt.
13  An alternative approach is to calculate the 
maximum affordable level of debt service and use that to calculate what percentage of the debt 
stock needs to be cancelled, rather than decide to cancel a part of the stock of debt based on a 
comparison with exports.  
  
Second is that HIPC needs a truth-in-accounting lesson.  Forgiving unpayable debts is 
simply accepting reality, not doing the debtors a favor (Roodman 2000). Daniel Cohen (2000) has 
used a model estimated on data from the Latin American debtor countries to infer what HIPCs’ 
                                                                                                                                                                
a group of 39 regional networks in 15 African countries argued that the PRSP is simply “window dressing” (Ranis and 
Stewart, 2001).  Further, the long list of hoops that countries need to jump through in order to have a PRSP approved 
by the World Bank and IMF (and thus receive the proceeds of debt relief) has forced countries to sacrifice a 
participatory approach in the face of time constraints.   
10 Addison and Rahman, 2001; Burnside and Fanizza, 2001. 
11 This argument is represented by Sachs et.al. (1999); Jubilee Plus (2001); and Oxfam (2001). 
12 The specific 150 percent benchmark used is also essentially arbitrary, being based on no more than a rule of thumb.  
The rule of thumb is based on a certain empirical regularity: the finding that defaults become much more common 
when debt/export ratios exceed something like 200 percent. But that empirical regularity is based on the experience of 
a different group of countries, most of which were much richer than the HIPCs. 
13 Limiting such diversions was proclaimed to be an underlying purpose of the HIPC initiative: that is reflected in the 
conditionality attached to HIPC, which is designed to ensure that the freed resources are indeed used for social 
programs and for other investments most likely to reduce poverty. 
  6debts would be worth in a secondary market, if the donors hadn’t continued to lend defensively to 
help cover debt service.  He finds that some 90 percent of the debt reduction ought to be counted 
as a loss (bad debt), and only the remaining 10 percent as ODA.  Other comparisons suggest a 
figure in the same ball-park. 
14  These calculations imply that deeper debt relief, to the point where 
it accepts the reality of what the debt is really worth, would not actually cost the donors anything 
much.   
 
  A third critique relates to the debt sustainability analyses that the World Bank/IMF team 
has been conducting in order to decide whether HIPC debt relief is enough to make the countries’ 
debt burdens sustainable. These are projection exercises, designed to test whether the proposed 
debt reductions are large enough to enable countries to keep their debt/export ratios below 150 
percent in the longer term (interpreted as out to the year 2017).  Projections from 2001 have been 
harshly criticized as overly-optimistic, defying both reality and the past performance of HIPC 
countries (Birdsall and Deese 2002, Eurodad 2001a, Jubilee Plus 2001, Culpepper 2001).     
 
For example, Uganda and Ethiopia are projected to grow at 6 percent a year for the next 
decade. That is a record achieved in the past by only a few countries like South Korea, Singapore 
and Ireland. In Africa, the rate has been more like 1 percent. The projections assume increases in 
the prices of primary commodities on which these countries depend. Yet in the last two decades, 
the trend in world prices for agricultural and natural resources has been at best erratic and at worst, 
consistently down.  Moreover, the projections ignore the poorest countries' vulnerability to drought 
and floods. A three-year drought has contributed to the collapse of agriculture in southern Africa 
this year (though so have civil conflict and political instability). 
 
This matters because many of the efficiency gains for countries from debt relief (explained 
in the previous section) rely on a predictably manageable stock of debt over the medium term.  If a 
HIPC country receives relief and then immediately falls back into a state of overindebetness 
because of an exogenous shock, much of the potential benefit of that debt relief is lost.   
  
Review of Proposals 
 
  In light of these criticisms, many alternatives or additions to the HIPC framework have 
been proposed.  Among some of them are: 
 
•  One hundred percent write-off for all HIPC countries.   Some Jubilee debt campaigners 
and scholars have argued that the donors should completely forgive the debts owed to them by 
HIPC countries.  Indeed, the notion of the Millennial Jubilee embodies this principle.
15  A 
                                                 
14 For example, in the 1980s the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now a HIPC) was quoted at under 10 cents on the 
dollar prior to the Brady Plan. And the US government, which is mandated by Congress to estimate the present value 
of its loan portfolio and expense reductions in value as they occur, applies a 92 percent discount to its HIPC debt 
(GAO 2000). 
15 A recent proposal by Jeff Sachs proposes that all post-HIPC debts be immediately converted into grant aid to 
address the HIV/AIDS crisis.  Sachs argues that there is no financial justification for keeping the remaining debt 
servicing obligations on these impoverished countries and that the few billion dollars per year in remaining debt 
service should be re-channeled as grants into urgent social needs.    
  7complete write-off for the 26 decision point HIPC countries would cost an estimated $27 billion in 
net present value (NPV) terms.
16   
 
But when considering a complete write-off, one must ask the question of whether that debt 
relief will be additional to current aid, and if not, which other developing countries will pay.  Most 
of the remaining debt held by HIPC countries is owed to multilateral creditors, since most bilateral 
creditors have already cancelled 100 percent of the debt owed to them.  Unless bilateral donors are 
willing to reimburse the multilateral creditors (with completely additional money) for the lost debt 
service as a result of 100 percent cancellation of the remaining multilateral debt, other poor 
countries are likely to end up footing the bill.   
 
Consider the case of the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA).  How would 
the World Bank group adjust if IDA’s HIPC assets were to be wiped out?
17  Drop the Debt argues 
that this would not involve the Bank sacrificing its triple-A credit rating.  This may be true but is 
nonetheless misleading in that one would still have to expect its borrowing costs to rise. If the 
World Bank’s reserves are in fact higher than optimal, then the Bank should certainly contribute 
more of its profits and use less of them to accumulate reserves, but the World Bank is likely 
incapable of making more than a marginal additional contribution.
18  It would therefore be 
necessary to either: 
 
•  raise charges to the World Bank’s regular borrowers; 
•  reduce future lending to IDA countries to match the reduced reflow of IDA funds; or 
•  invest World Bank funds in income-earning assets and use the interest earned to make grants to 
poor countries (Meltzer Commission and Lerrick). 
 
The first would make it more expensive to borrow from the Bank, so the burden would fall on 
such borrowers, which means primarily the middle-income developing countries but also relatively 
low-income countries such as China and Indonesia. It would be possible to make this cost 
transitional by rebuilding the Bank’s reserves over time, but that would imply either cutting back 
the Bank’s lending or else adding further to the cost of borrowing. In either event it is the Bank’s 
regular borrowers who would pay. The idea that the World Bank (let alone any of the other 
development banks) sits on a heap of functionless cash is just wrong.  
 
The second approach requires that other IDA borrowers bear the cost of forgiving HIPC debts. 
It is true that the fall in lending would be exactly equal to the reduction in amortization payments 
                                                 
16 This figure includes $5 billion in additional bilateral relief that has already been committed.  NPV of debt equals the 
sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest 
rate.  Since much of the debt of HIPC countries was contracted on concessional (below market) interest rates, NPV is a 
more appropriate measure of the burden that a country’s debt stock imposes. 
17 For the partial write-off under enhanced HIPC, the approach incorporated in present plans is to draw on a trust fund, 
which is partially funded by donors and partially by contributions from World Bank profits (the latter already a slight 
tax on non-HIPC borrowers).  But even now donor contributions to the trust fund are not adequate to finance fully the 
enhanced HIPC initiative (the money presently in the trust fund will only last until 2005), let alone full debt 
cancellation. 
18    
  8due from the HIPCs, so that there would be no collective benefit or cost to IDA’s clients.
19 But 
while there would be no cost to IDA borrowers taken collectively, one again needs to ask whether 
there would be distribution effects. Suppose the Bank arranged for its IDA lending to each 
borrowing country to contract by the amount of the country’s reduced repayment obligations?  
That would imply reduced new grants or lending to HIPC countries, and would provoke furious 
criticism that it was deliberately denying countries the benefits of debt relief.
20 Otherwise, the 
presumption has to be that loans to non-HIPC IDA borrowers would contract.  But that means 
IDA-only borrowers like Bangladesh and blend borrowers like India and Indonesia would be the 
ones paying for HIPC!. Given that IDA has based its lending quite consciously to take into accont 
countries’ needs given their poverty levels,
21 there is a strong likelihood that such a redistribution 
would have a perverse effect on the global fight against poverty.  
 
The Meltzer-Lerrick plan is to have reflows into IDA invested in income-earning assets, and 
then use the income generated to make grants. The disadvantage of this is that, unless IDA reflows 
were to be supplemented by large additional donor contributions, the initial impact would be a 
severe reduction in the flow of IDA money. (If the assets in which IDA invested yielded 7 percent, 
then the flow would initially decline by 93 percent in the absence of additional donor funding.)  
 
The African Development Bank is even less able to write off the debts it is owed without 
undermining its financial position than is the World Bank.
22  The cost of the HIPC initiative (in 
NPV terms) represents 102 percent of the AfDB’s reserves and loan loss provisions. Comparable 
figures are 23 percent for the World Bank, 13 percent for the InterAmerican Development Bank, 
and 20 percent for the IMF. Financing the HIPC initiative is even more problematic for some of 
the small sub-regional development banks (see Box on CABEI). 
 
There are two morals to this discussion. The first is that additionality matters. The second is 
that it is wrong to think of the multilateral banks’ reserves as ‘additional’.  Raiding reserves to 
forgive HIPC debt would come at the expense of other developing countries, perhaps ones that are 
equally poor and that have been making better headway in combating poverty. The result could 
well be a reduction rather than an increase in the rate at which global poverty declines and a 
further threat to achievement of the Millennium development goals. 
 
• Change the ratio for calculating debt relief.  Oxfam (2001) proposed that no low-income 
country should be expected to spend more than 10 percent of government revenue on debt service.  
This proposal responded to the criticism that a country’s debt-to-export ratio was an ill-suited 
measure to address the needs and constraints of poor countries.  This idea forms the foundation for 
a proposal that is currently being considered by the US Congress.  The Debt Relief Enhancement 
                                                 
19  The reduction in amortization payments seems to have been overlooked by World Bank spokesmen who have 
sometimes argued that IDA’s inability to maintain the same level of new lending would be damaging collectively to 
the countries that borrow from IDA. 
20 One could expect many more comments like:  “In an almost cynical game of bait and switch, countries like 
Mozambique have seen the benefits of debt relief canceled out by corresponding reductions in aid, resulting in no net 
gain for social development activities in the national budget.” Edmund Cain, “Helping poor nations lifts all boats”, 
Atlanta Constitution, 23 August 2001. 
21 As in the framework that Burnside and Dollar outline (2000). 
22   To the extent that the debt is uncollectable, one should say that its financial position has been even more eroded 
than that of the World Bank, and hence the question of whether it should be recapitalized is even more critical. 
  9Act of 2002 (DREA) which has been introduced in both the US House and Senate, would establish 
an additional revenue-based criterion for debt relief -- limiting HIPCs’ debt service to 10% of 
revenue or to 5% in cases where a “Public Health Crisis” exists as defined by a high HIV/AIDS 
infection rate.
23  The new criterion would result in a total of more than $1 billion in additional 
annual debt service relief. 
 
  We agree with the spirit though not the letter of this proposal.  It makes more sense to link 
debt relief to needs than exports.  However, the difficulty that with a revenue-based debt relief 
criteria is the incentive that it gives a government to limit its search for tax revenue. Under the 
proposed legislation (which embodies the Oxfam formula), 10 percent of any extra tax revenue is 
immediately siphoned off for debt service. Perhaps 10 percent is not a high enough figure to 
generate a severe disincentive effect, but it is hard to be sure. And even if there is no disincentive 
effect, there is surely an equity effect: a country is rewarded for having failed to collect enough 
taxes to pay for a decent level of social expenditures.
24  
 
The basic problem with the revenue based approach is that the likelihood that it would 
divert funding away from other low income countries toward the HIPCs irrespective of the relative 
quality of countries’ tax effort and spending allocations.  This is much more than a hypothetical 
danger.  The increasing dependence on aid of the heavily indebted poor countries, primarily in 
Africa, has played a role in reducing aid to India, from 1.5 percent of its GNP a decade ago to as 
little as 0.1 percent currently, despite the fact that India’s tax and spending programs are relatively 
reasonable and its record in reducing poverty much better than that of most of the HIPCs.  Below 
we refer to what we see as a more efficient though perhaps less politically appealing formula that 
is needs-based.     
 
 
A Three-Pronged Solution: Deepen, Widen, and Insure 
 
In our book, Delivering on Debt Relief we detail a three-pronged proposal to improve the 
enhanced HIPC initiative.  In this paper we will briefly mention the first two components and then 
expand on the third, which has become more clearly necessary (and politically and practically 
feasible) in recent months.   
 
Deepen debt relief – It is clear that HIPC countries need more resources for basic 
education, health – particularly the AIDS crisis – and infrastructure investments to lift them out of 
poverty.  There is political momentum to do more in this group of countries -- mainly small 
                                                 
23 The term “Public Health Crisis” has been defined as a nation in which 5% of women at prenatal clinics or 20% of 
individuals in groups with high-risk behavior, test positive for HIV/AIDS according to data compiled by the Joint 
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
24 An even more profound departure from the current approach has been urged by Eurodad, in arguing for a country-
by-country analysis of how much debt each country can afford to carry without preempting resources available for 
spending on a basic level of social service delivery. One curiosity is that the country that would get the largest increase 
in grant aid is Niger, which is a rather small country of about 10 million people but nevertheless is awarded almost a 
quarter billion dollars of extra grant aid. This is not because Eurodad projects its social expenditure needs to be 
particularly high: the figure is actually slightly below their average for per capita expenditure needs. Rather, Niger is 
an outlier because it raises less tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (only 10.2 percent) than any other HIPC. Does one 
really want to reward countries for failing to get their citizens to pay a reasonable level of taxation? 
  10African countries highly dependent on primary commodities and most affected by AIDS.  
Additional debt relief is a sensible mechanism to transfer additional resources.   
 
We agree with Oxfam, the sponsors if the DREA, and others that additional debt reduction 
should be based on the relation between a country’s debt payments (or service) and its social and 
other needs (e.g. to escape a poverty trap).  Since using a country’s tax revenue in the denominator 
builds in a potentially unhealthy incentive structure, we recommend a formula that keys the 
debt service ceiling directly to the level of GNP. That is one variable that no government is 
going to suppress in order to minimize its debt service bill, and which provides the best single 
estimate of the ability to afford social services.   
 
Most HIPCs in 1999 collected about 20 percent of their GNP in tax revenue, and a 
reasonable proportion of revenue to spend on debt service is 10 percent; 10 percent of 20 percent 
implies spending 2 percent of GNP on debt service.  That 2 percent is sustainable, in the sense 
that it does not require unusual sacrifices by citizens.  
 
The proposal is not very different from the DREA in terms of cost.  It would relieve an 
additional $700 million of debt service in 2003 for key development needs in 11 HIPCs that are 
not already at 2 percent debt service to GNP ratio.  The 2 percent threshold could be revisited in 
the context of the DREA and other initiatives, but the logic of using a debt service-to-GNP as the 
criteria for additional debt relief should be employed.           
 
Widen eligibility to include other low-income countries – Some very poor countries with 
substantial official debt burdens are not eligible for the HIPC initiative—for the odd reason that 
they have (or had) good enough credit to gain some access to private capital markets.  The official 
debt of Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and another 16 poor countries is undermining their ability to 
get back on a growth track.  If and when they meet the conditions of an IMF program, reducing 
their debt stock to a sustainable level would cost between about $20 billion and $70 billion, 
depending on whether Indonesia is included. 
 
  Including these countries in a debt relief initiative would dramatically increase the cost to 
donors.  It also brings up the difficult question of selectivity.  Making a country like Nigeria 
eligible for debt relief contingent on an IMF program may release significant resources to the 
Nigerian government before it is clear that they are able or willing to use those resources for the 
benefit of its citizens.  Including the large poor countries in a debt relief initiative could bring the 
benefits to hundreds of millions more poor people, but could also undermine the positive 
institutional changes that HIPC and the PRSP are meant to catalyze.   
 
This tension exists in the current HIPC framework, as pressure from activists to expedite 
the process of getting countries to decision point has diluted the standard (e.g. to the extent that the 
Democratic Republic of Congo may soon reach decision point).  The original HIPC goal embodied 
selectivity, expecting that significant measurable progress be made before decision point (and, of 
course, additional progress between decision and completion points).  The process has now slid 
more toward traditional conditionality, granting decision point contingent on reforms to be 
undertaken in the future.  DRC is still in arrears to all its major creditors, despite recent action by 
  11the IMF, World Bank, and AfDB to help clear them.  With a projected decision point of January 
2003, a component of interim HIPC relief to DRC will be used to pay off remaining arrears.  
  
 
Insure HIPCs against external shocks – In Delivering on Debt Relief, we suggested that  
low-income countries’ vulnerability to shocks in weather and export prices could be addressed by 
granting additional relief whenever shocks that are clearly exogenous to the country result in a new 
erosion of debt sustainability.  This proposal was meant to address not only poor countries unique 
vulnerabilities, but also the tendency of the World Bank and IMF to choose optimism over reality 
when conducting HIPC debt sustainability analyses.    
 
  A program that offers adequate insurance to HIPC countries that their debt sustainability 
will not be undermined by clearly exogenous circumstances is the key to capturing the many 
benefits of debt relief outlined in the first section of this paper.  Private sector investment, the 
ultimate key to poverty reduction and growth, is wary of the multiple risks of investing in HIPC 
economies.  If enlightened leaders, in coordination with legislatures and civil society, hold up their 
side of the compact – adhering to the priorities of the PRSP, attacking corruption, and building 
strong institutions – then it is in the global community’s interest to insure that these countries 
maintain a sustainable debt profile to catalyze growth.    
  
  This concept has become more important as new data for countries currently within the 
HIPC framework has become available. The IMF recently reported that as many as half the 
countries receiving debt relief will be thrown back into an unsustainable debt situation by 
next year.  Of the four countries already to reach completion point, two – Uganda and Bolivia – 
are projected to have debt-to-export levels above 150% in 2003.  In most cases, the increases in the 
debt indicators were the result of less than predicted export growth, due to the global economic 
slowdown and the continued decline of a number primary commodity prices.  New borrowing does 
not seem to have contributed to the ballooning debt-to-export ratios.   
 
Given this new outlook, one might assume that the projections for future performance 
would have been revised downward, thus highlighting the need for deeper relief to ensure ongoing 
debt sustainability.  What we see in the IMF report instead, are revised projections that still assume 
an average of almost 6 percent GDP growth rate, an early “recovery” to that high rate, and greater 
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The current enhanced HIPC initiative has built in mechanisms to address the issue of 
exogenous shocks, but they fall short in three critical ways:   
 
• Time horizon. The HIPC framework does allow a procedure whereby a new debt 
sustainability analysis is conducted at the completion point and a country that has suffered a severe 
exogenous deterioration in its circumstances between decision and completion points might be 
entitled to additional relief (World Bank and IMF 2001b).  This procedure, known as ‘topping-up,’ 
provides some measure of insurance for HIPC countries for the period between decision and 
completion points.
25  That interim period, originally envisaged to average three years, has now 
been condensed to less than 18 months.  As mentioned above, ensuring an adequate period of 
predictably sustainable debt is a critical component of the success of debt relief in catalyzing 
poverty reduction and growth.  Reasonable people can argue about what length of time is 
‘adequate’ (we suggest 10 years as explained below) but it is clear that the ‘topping up’ 
mechanism does not achieve this objective.   
 
The case of Uganda illustrates this point.  Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt 
relief under the original HIPC initiative, and the first to reach enhanced HIPC completion point, in 
May 2000.  Often considered the HIPC poster child, Uganda’s successful national dialogue on 
poverty reduction in the 1990s was one of the models in designing the PRSP.  But in 2002, 
Uganda’s debt is projected to rise to 254 percent of exports, well above its 1999 levels and more 
than double the projected level of 117 percent.  The culprit?  Not economic mismanagement but a 
                                                 
25 The first case of topping-up occurred in April 2002 when Burkina Faso was granted an additional $128 million at 
completion point.   
  13secular decline in world coffee prices, due primarily to Vietnam’s entrance into the world market.  
To quote the recent IMF report, “while the importance of ensuring adequate adjustments in 
domestic policies in the face of external shocks cannot be overstated, it is equally important to 
complement such policies with external support, including adequate funds to help deal with 
cashflow problems arising from exogenous shocks.”   We agree.  But there is no reason why this 
virtue should not apply to Uganda over the medium term, solely because they were successful in 
jumping too early through the HIPC loops.           
 
• Burden of proof.  While the granting of additional assistance to Burkina Faso at 
completion point was a welcome signal that ‘topping-up’ was more than lip-service, there is still 
considerable uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances the IMF will agree to grant 
additional resources.  The criteria as stated in the IMF paper of 2001 addressing this issue are “a 
fundamental change in a country’s economic circumstances…clearly due to an exogenous 
development.”  But the paper emphasizes that topping up is reserved for “exceptional” 
circumstances, and that part of the reason for changing the criterion from 200 to 150 percent debt-
to-GDP was to give countries a cushion that would make topping up unnecessary.  The 
comprehensive assessment undertaken to identify fundamental change and exogenous factors is 
based on IMF and World Bank projections (already shown to be over-optimistic) and require 
demonstrating that the disruption will be felt for a minimum of 3-5 years.  While we certainly want 
to avoid creating moral hazard with an insurance facility that is too generous, the current system 
hardly provides the kind of predictability and certainty necessary to reassure potential investors of 
minimal debt sustainability in HIPC countries.   
 
• Perverse incentives?  By limiting access to additional funds to the period between 
decision and completion points, the HIPC framework may compel interim countries and those yet 
to reach decision point to delay their completion date and increase their interim borrowing, in an 
attempt to squeeze all the benefits out of the HIPC initiative before they are thrown to the wolves.  
Indeed, we have already seen over-borrowing (beyond what was projected) in Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Benin and Honduras in the interim period.           
 
A more predictable and sustainable insurance facility for HIPC countries’ debt would 
address these shortcomings.  The facility would need to cover a substantial period into the future, 
at least a decade
26, if it were to serve the role of reassuring investors that the public sector’s debt 
burden is sustainable.  Each year the IMF would calculate whether each HIPC’s debt/export ratio 
exceeded the 2% of GNP proposed above. If it did, then it would examine whether the excess (or 
how much of the excess) could be attributed to shocks to the terms of trade, bad weather, or other 
factors that could reasonably be considered exogenous, as compared to a more realistic set of 
baseline projections.  The IMF would make this calculus available for public scrutiny, and provide 
enough money to reduce the debts back to a sustainable level.    
 
How much would such a facility cost?  It is, of course, impossible to cost such a facility ex 
ante, since the outlay will depend upon the particular size and sequence of shocks to which the 
countries are subjected. Nevertheless, the cost of topping-up in 2003 for the current decision point 
HIPCs – estimated at $500 million – gives some idea of what the actual cost would be, admittedly 
                                                 
26   But probably it ought not to cover much more than a decade, so as not to create moral hazard by destroying a 
country’s incentive to diversify its economy to reduce its vulnerability to exogenous shocks. 
  14during a world recession that has weakened commodity prices.  Thus $5 billion would be a 
pessimistic estimate of the cost for these 26 countries over ten years.  Considering that 10 of the 
remaining 12 HIPC eligible countries yet to reach decision point are highly dependent on 
commodity exports, a cost of $5 billion for the entire set of HIPCs over ten years is optimistic.
27
 
  Another way to get a sense of the hypothetical cost of such a contingency facility is to 
suppose that the value of each HIPC’s exports for the next decade rose only at the same rate as in 
the 1990s (or remained flat, for countries whose exports declined in the past). Suppose also that 
this occurred because of much less favorable developments in the terms of trade than were 
assumed in the World Bank/IMF study, which would qualify as an exogenous development. Our 
calculation as to how much this would cost is shown in the table below, where it can be seen that 
the cost would be some $5.2 billion for the 24 countries that had reached decision point by March 
2002. Of course, it is not likely that all countries would end up mirroring the experience of the 
1990s – perhaps equally unlikely as them achieving 8.2 percent annual export growth -- but the 
estimate again suggests that $5 billion may be an optimistic figure for the cost of such a procedure 
for al HIPCs. 
 
And it would cost nothing at all if the IMF and World Bank’s rosy projections prove right 
for every country!   
 
Such contingent facilities are not completely new to the international system. The IMF has 
for many years operated a Contingency Financing Facility that lends (though it does not grant) 
money to IMF member countries experiencing a shortfall in export proceeds due to circumstances 
outside their control. Similarly, the Mexican bonds issued under the Brady Plan included 
contingent payments to their holders that allowed them to benefit if the price of Mexican oil 




  In this section, we focus on the financing mechanisms for the insurance facility.  In 
Delivering on Debt Relief we propose ways to finance both the deepening and expanding of a 
HIPC-style debt reduction program.  In the time since publication, more bilateral creditors have 
moved to 100 percent cancellation of debt owed to them by HIPC countries, which has lowered the 
potential cost of deepening.  For example, the DREA to bring HIPC countries to the 10 and 5 
percent of debt service to revenue levels would only cost the US $43 million in 2003.  The issue of 
debt in HIPC countries – and thus additional debt reduction – is increasingly becoming a 
multilateral debt issue.  On the issue of expansion, the cost has made serious consideration 
politically infeasible, although some US congressmen have expressed interest in taking up the 
issue in subsequent years.   
 
  To finance the insurance facility for HIPC country debt, we propose tapping an important 
under valued resurce that belongs to the world community – IMF gold.  The IMF currently has 
substantial holdings of gold on its books that are valued at the old official price of SDR 35 per 
ounce (currently about $45), compared to the market price of about $290 per ounce. In 1999, it 
mobilized 14 of the Fund’s 103 million ounces of gold, the interest from which helped finance the 
                                                 
27 The extra countries that we are suggesting adding are mostly much less vulnerable to commodity shocks.    
  15IMF’s portion of HIPC.   At the current price, this would yield something over $20 billion if the 
whole of the Fund’s undervalued gold were to be mobilized.  
 
Since gold has long since ceased to serve any serious monetary function, IMF gold could 
be used to pay for the annual cost of the HIPC insurance facility. It is true that this would amount 
to reducing the IMF’s reserves, but, unlike the multilateral development banks, the IMF does not 
need a reserve to reassure lenders and thus permit it to borrow cheaply.  The only function of the 
IMF gold stock is to reassure central bankers that their funds are safe with the IMF.
28  We believe 
that the needs of the HIPCs and other poor countries are many times more compelling than 
safeguarding against the contingency of central bank irrationality.  
 
Some would argue that despite the possible resistance in the U.S. Congress to IMF gold 
sales (or the complication that the Congress would insist on other reforms at the IMF in exchange 
for its approval), gold sales are all too easy and cheap an escape for the donors.  We do not think 
this logic warrants rejecting gold sales altogether.  Debt relief (and new transfers) have large 
potential benefits for reducing poverty, especially if the amount of relief is predictably sustained.   
This is true even if an insurance facility does not appear to “cost” the traditional donors anything.   
 
 
     
                                                 
28 The IMF thinks that holding a lot of undervalued gold “provides fundamental strength to [its] balance sheet” and 
“provides the IMF operational maneuverability” (www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm) More specifically, the 
Fund argues that its gold holdings matter in allowing even conservative central bankers to treat quota increases as an 
asset swap rather than a donation, since they know that if necessary the Fund could sell some gold to keep its balance 
sheet whole if some of its loans to distressed debtors were to sour. While the Fund does indeed lend to countries with 
major macro problems, its record in recovering debts on its own balance sheet (as opposed to that of the PRGF, which 
has a separate balance sheet) is sufficiently sound to make it perfectly sensible for its members to treat quota increases 
as asset swaps, with or without the Fund’s extra “gold” security. 
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BOXES: 
 
1: Debt Initiatives 
 
• 1987: Special Program of Assistance for Africa.  Informal donor association managed by the World Bank to provide bilateral 
debt relief, IDA credits for IBRD debt service relief, and funding for commercial debt buybacks.  Available to African IDA-
only borrowers with debt service-to-exports above 30% (initially 21 countries). 
 
• 1988:  Paris Club: Toronto Terms.  First agreement by Paris Club creditors to implement new treatment on the debt of low-
income countries.  The level of reduction was defined as 33.33%.).29
 
• 1989: Brady Plan.  World Bank and IMF facilitated debt and debt service reductions by commercial bank creditors.  Most 
Brady deals went to middle-income countries. 
 
• 1989: IDA Debt Reduction Facility.  Established to restructure and buy back commercial debt with IDA credits (average 
88% discount).  Available to low-income countries (heavily indebted IDA-only borrowers).  Funded from IBRD net income 
transfer.   
 
• 1990: Paris Club: Houston Terms.  Agreement to implement a new treatment of the debt of the lower middle-income 
countries.  Houston terms had three components: repayment periods lengthened to or beyond 15 years and ODA 
repayment periods lengthened up to 20 years with a maximum of 10-year grace; ODA rescheduled at a concessional rate, 
and the introduction of bilateral debt swaps. 
 
• 1991: Paris Club: London (“Enhanced Toronto”) Terms.  Debt service reduced 50% on non-concessional bilateral debt (12 
year grace, 30 year maturity). 
 
• 1995: Paris Club: Naples Terms.  Debt service reduced 67% on non-concessional bilateral debt (16 year grace, 40 year 
maturity).  Option of debt stock cancellation (5 stock deals processed).30
 
• 1996: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  Debt stock reduction to bring debt/export ratio under 200% for 41 
heavilyindebted and poor countries.  Participation of multilateral creditors. 
 
• 1996: Paris Club: Lyon Terms.  Agreement within HIPC framework for 80% relief on non-concessional bilateral debt for 
HIPC-eligible countries. 
 
• 1999: Enhanced HIPC (HIPC II) Initiative.  Increased stock reductions to bring debt of HIPCs to under 150% debt-to-
exports.  Interim debt service reduction between decision and completion points.  Relief conditioned on the completion of 
comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 
 
• 1999: Paris Club: Cologne Terms.  Agreement within HIPC framework, where non-ODA credits are cancelled up to a 90% 
level or more if necessary in the context of the HIPC initiative (including topping-up). ODA credits are rescheduled at an 
interest rate at least as favorable as the original concessional interest rate applying to these loans (40 years with 16-year 
grace and progressive repayment). 
                                                 
29 Paris Club debt reduction decisions are made according to five principles: case-by-case decision-making, consensus, 
conditionality (the existence and continuation of an IMF program), solidarity, and comparability of treatment. 
30 Option of stock treatments was/is implemented “on a case-by-case basis, for countries having established a 
satisfactory track record with both the Paris Club and IMF and for which there is sufficient confidence in their ability 
to respect the debt agreement.” (Paris Club website).   
 




The example of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration highlights the distributive challenges of offering debt 
relief to a limited number of countries.  CABEI has been operating in the region since 1960, and is the second largest source 
of financing for the countries of Central America.  In 1999, when the Enhanced HIPC initiative was announced, it became 
clear that it posed a significant problem for CABEI.  Two of CABEI’s five members (Honduras and Nicaragua) were eligible 
for relief.  Under the HIPC terms, the burden of debt relief imposed was equivalent to half of CABEI’s net worth.  For 
CABEI, financing this effort without help from the international community would have threatened the solvency of the 
institution.  Furthermore, it would have involved a transfer of resources from some poor countries to others, negating the 
underlying rationale for the HIPC initiative.  Thus the leadership of CABEI appealed to the World Bank and the 
international community for assistance in covering their share of debt reduction in Honduras and Nicaragua.  An 
agreement was reached with the G-7, European Union, World Bank and IMF for more than half of CABEI’s share to be paid 
out of the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund.  Nevertheless, CABEI committed significant resources of its own to the HIPC 
initiative, becoming the first institution to grant debt relief to Honduras ($252 million) in April 2000 (it subsequently wrote 
off $435 million of Nicaragua’s debt.) 
 
Looking to the future, CABEI is constrained in its ability to lend to Honduras and Nicaragua, because under the HIPC 
arrangement it is not permitted to lend to these countries on non-concessional terms, and it has not traditionally had a fund 
with resources for concessional loans.  CABEI has created a new Special Trust Fund for Social Transformation in Central 
America to finance loans on concessional terms, but this facility has received only $9 million in commitments.   
 
 
  20Table: Hypothetical Cost of Contingency Procedure 
   HIPC Export Projections  Ex. Growth   Revised Export Projections  2010 Debt Stock  Debt-to-Export Ratio Stock Goal  Reduction 




Revised  at 150%  .. 
Benin          
               
               
               
               
              
               
               
             
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
              
               
               
               
               
               
          
392 791 2.5 489 795 1.63 734 62 
Bolivia 1442 3108 3.6 2054 3333 1.62 3081 252 
Burkina Faso  305  751  -2.6  305  1024  3.36  458  567 
Cameroon 2586 4248 0.0 2586 4248 1.64 3879 369 
Chad 242 1978 0.6 255 934 3.66 383 552 
Ethiopia 952 1815 2.6 1199 2439 2.03 1799 641 
The Gambia  128  233  2.7  163  301  1.85  245  57 
Ghana 2416 4597 11.1 6180 3503 0.57 .. .. 
Guinea 860 1647 -1.0 860 1565 1.82 1290 275 
Guinea-Bissau
 
71 181 7.5 136 248 1.82 204 44 
Guyana 718 1037 5.0 1114 736 0.66 .. .. 
Honduras* 2673 5456 8.5 4361 3323 0.76 .. .. 
Madagascar 1046 1811 6.5 1731 1929 1.11 .. .. 
Malawi 480 763 2.1 579 1148 1.98 869 280 
Mali 662 1190 2.3 812 1520 1.87 1218 302 
Mauritania** 433 528 -2.5 433 656 1.52 650 7 
Mozambique 805 3451 6.8 1455 1611 1.11 .. .. 
Nicaragua* 932 1570 10.0 1651 1712 1.04 .. .. 
Niger 279 484 -4.5 279 768 2.75 419 350 
Rwanda 126 367 -3.0 126 541 4.29 189 352 
Sao Tome  18  42  5.0  28  59  2.11  42  17 
Senegal 1692 2765 -1.0 1692 2364 1.40 .. .. 
Sierra Leone  121  330  -5.0  121  127  1.05  ..  .. 
Tanzania* 1194 2274 7.9 1884 3525 1.87 2826 699 
Uganda 801 1953 11.5 2134 1320 0.62 .. .. 
Zambia 1038 2207 -3.0 1036 2575 2.49 1554 1021 
Total  w/out Chad  5292 
Note: We exclude Chad from the total because of the likely increases in exports due to exploitation of oil reserves. 
*Stock in 2007; ** 2006  
 
 Appendix: Ten Questions about Debt and Debt Relief 
 
1. How much debt is there, and to whom is it owed? 
 
Debt owed by the HIPC countries is about $170 billion (in 1999 nominal terms).31  Almost 50% of this is owed to 
bilateral creditors – mostly the U.S, Japan, France, Britain and other countries of Europe.  Another 37% is owed to 
multilateral creditors: the World Bank, IMF and the regional and sub-regional development banks; and 13% to private 
creditors (of which almost all is backed by a sovereign guarantee).  
 
The debt of the HIPCs represents only 8% of the developing world’s approximate $2 trillion debt, and only 35% of the 
debt of all the low-income countries (using the World Bank’s country classification of “low-income”, which includes 
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan).  For the developing world as a whole, about 25% of debt is owed to bilaterals, 
17% to multilaterals, and the remaining 60% to private creditors (half of which is not covered by a sovereign 
guarantee).   
   
2. What portion of the debt stock of the poorest countries would be deemed uncollectable and written off or 
canceled if conventional accounting practices of commercial banks were followed?   
 
Commercial banks would eventually be required to provision against debt that has lost much of its value.  
One measure of the value of commercial debt is the price it commands in the market.  In the late 1980s, $1 
of commercial debt of countries like Bolivia and Nicaragua (now HIPCs) was worth as little as 10 cents on 
the dollar in the market – meaning that the market judged about 90 percent of its value to be uncollectable. 
Most HIPC debt is owed not to commercial but to official creditors, so there is no such market measure.  
However, the US government – which is congressionally mandated to estimate the present value of its loan 
portfolio and expense reduction in values as they occur – applies a 92% discount to the HIPC debt.  On the 
other hand, in 1999 HIPCs paid about 85 percent of the debt service they were due to pay – but they were 
only able to do this because of big receipts of new aid.     
 
3. What portion of the debt of the poor (HIPC) countries would be labeled “unjust” or “odious” by 
reasonable observers? 
 
“Odious” debt has been legally defined as debt assumed by governments without the consent of the people 
and not for their benefit.  Over the past three decades as much as 60 percent of private and public loans 
were committed by creditors to countries subsequently labeled as not free, or corrupt in the year of the 
commitment, according to some international indices.  In the Congo (former Zaire), Nicaragua, Pakistan 
and other heavilyindebted poor countries, there were periods when governments borrowed heavily to 
purchase military equipment of little benefit to ordinary citizens (Nicaragua in the 1970s), to invest in white 
elephant projects (Pakistan in the 1970s), or to pad the foreign bank accounts of corrupt dictators (Zaire 
under Mobutu).  One approach is to label as odious all debt assumed by “odious” governments – since 
even borrowing for good projects by odious governments may have simply made it easier to steal or misuse 
domestic resources. A simple measure of odious or unjust debt might then be all debt assumed by such 
governments.  Unfortunately, labeling and quantifying “odious” debt does not provide much useful 
guidance on how much to forgive now (for more on the odious debt issue, see Kremer and Jayachandran 
2001, and the appendix of Birdsall, Williamson and Deese 2002).   
  
4. Who should be asked to pay for debt relief?   
 
                                                 
31 The amount of debt is often expressed in net present value (NPV) terms.  The NPV takes into account the fact that 
amounts owed in the future impore less of a burden than an equal amount owed now, for the same face value.  The 
NPV of HIPC countries’ current debt is about $107 billion. 
  23In a conventional bankruptcy proceeding, the creditors are expected to recognize that their assets are worth 
less than face value, and have them scaled down to what the debtor can afford to pay.  . Almost all of the 
debt of the poorest countries is owed to official, not private commercial creditors. That means that it has 
been rich country governments that have either loaned directly to poor country governments, or have 
allowed the World Bank, the IMF, or other institutions that they control to make the now “bad” loans. So 
when push comes to shove, it is the taxpayers of the rich country governments that are the creditors of the 
poor country governments, and who thus have to bear the costs of debt relief.  Rich country taxpayers 
basically have to foot the bill, except insofar as they might authorize the IMF to sell some of its gold, unless 
they choose to shift the burden to other poor countries.  
  
5. What about loans to purchase G-7 goods?  How should they be treated in an analysis of debt relief? 
 
The HIPC initiative involves a 90 percent write-off of bilateral debt (Paris Club ‘Cologne Terms’), and a 
number of countries, including the US and UK, have moved unilaterally to completely write-off their 
bilateral HIPC debts.  This means in a sense that the past sins of ‘tied aid’ are wiped clean.  We have argued 
that one of debt relief’s central advantages over additional new aid is the efficiency gain that comes from 
releasing poor countries from the kind of nonsense involved in aid contracts mandating the purchase of 
high-priced Western goods and services.  The OECD countries have pledged to end the practice of tied aid, 
but they have not yet applied this pledge to the two most insidious areas: technical cooperation and food 
aid.         
 
6. How much good would it do the debtor countries if their debt were completely instead of partially 
written-off?  What negative impact would result in the creditor countries?   
 
In 1999, the HIPCs paid about $8 billion in debt service on their outstanding stock of debt ($170 billion, 
nominal).  If the debt stock were to be completely eliminated, then would the HIPCs get an immediate $8 
billion-a-year windfall?  We doubt it.  Over the past two decades, the HIPCs have continued to receive large 
positive net transfers of resources -- on the order of $10 billion in the second half of the 1990s – over and 
above their debt service payments.  We doubt that the donor governments (who would have to show in 
their own budgets the “cost” of the unpaid debt) and the multilateral creditors (who would no longer need 
to make new loans to help countries pay back old loans) would refrain from cutting back, at least 
somewhat, on new transfers.  In fact that seems to have already happened in the late 1990s, when despite 
higher debt relief, total transfers including debt relief, not only failed to rise, but actually fell.  The impact 
on creditor countries is so tiny in financial terms that it makes no sense to quantify it.  And even if the 
HIPCs got a full $8 billion windfall, there would be a question of equity if part of it came at the expense of 
other poor countries – countries that have made better use of the resources in stimulating development and 
combating poverty 
   
7.  Why is debt a worthwhile focal point when talking about development in poor countries? 
 
While debt relief is just another form of resource transfer to poor countries, there are (as we explain in 
section 1) some good reasons to favor somewhat more debt relief over new grants or loans.  On the other 
hand, even complete debt relief would be only a small step toward reducing poverty and advancing 
development, and would be small compared to the potential benefits of better market access.  Even with 
more debt relief, a seriously stepped-up rich country effort to commit new resources is crucial.   
  
8. Are children really dying because of the debt burden imposed on poor countries? 
 
We think it is wrong to assert that.  Why?  Because the poorest and most indebted countries have generally 
been receiving much more aid each year than what they pay in debt service.  In the worst cases, much of 
their new aid was needed to pay their debt service – but even then they ended up at least slightly ahead.  
  24There are, of course, other more fundamental reasons why children are dying, and insufficient resources is 
one of them   
 
9. Who are the central players in the debt relief debate, and who should the central players be?  Who has 
the voice, and who should have the voice? 
 
The big players in the debate about debt relief have been:  
(1)  the large donor countries – to whom much of the debt is owed, and who have the most influence in 
the World Bank and the IMF, the institutions that manage the HIPC program -- and  
(2)  Nongovernmental activist organizations such as Jubilee, Eurodad and others mentioned in the text 
(and see the bibliography), based mostly in those rich countries but with local affiliates in many 
debtor countries.   
 
Group #1 has been a quiet but powerful player – proceeding with deeper debt relief when it became 
obvious the shell game of making new grants and loans to finance debtors’ debt service was undermining 
the logic and effectiveness of development assistance, though then only at a pace and on terms they could 
financially and politically “afford.”  Group #2 has created the persistent and healthy pressure on Group #1 
needed to make the process deeper, broader and more transparent.   
 
10. What steps would most advance development in poor countries?  Would debt relief even be one of 
them?  
 
Five steps most critical to reducing poverty and advancing development in today’s poor countries are:  
a)  stable and honest government that commands the assent of the governed; 
b)  market-oriented economic policies, relying on private investment and entrepreneurship to generate 
good investments and jobs;  
c)  a social contract: adequate health, education and other social investments that provide economic 
and social opportunity for all; and 
d)  good access to rich country markets; and  
e)  an additional $50 billion a year in development assistance to build the institutions and finance the 
programs noted above that can help them escape poverty traps.   
 
But those reflect the opinions of the authors; others might choose other steps.   
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